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By Cecilie Eriksen1 
 
Legitimacy challenges are part of human societies. Whenever we recognise a 
person, law, ideal or institution as authoritative, questions can be raised about 
their legitimacy. Why follow this law? Why strive to honour this moral ideal? If 
such questions are repeatedly raised, they pose an undermining threat to the 
authorities in question. This is good if the challenged law or ideal is harmful, 
but problematic, if it is beneficial. Where the first kind of legitimacy challenges 
are raised by ethical pioneers and moral critics, the last kind are posed by cynics, 
who disregard the demands of law and morality when they conflict with their 
interests. The threat to human society caused by cynicism is part of the reason 
why philosophers since Plato have sought to address and rid society of it. 
This article discusses how philosophy can deal with cynicism. It does so 
by firstly looking at how Anthony Holiday defends a moral realist theory and 
disproves ‘the theory of cynicism’ as well as tries to subvert real life cynics. 
Secondly, the work of the later Wittgenstein is used to discuss Holiday’s ap-
proach, finding it to some extent wanting in both its theoretical and practical 
aims.2 Lastly, inspired by Stanley Cavell’s thinking it is suggested that cynicism 
 
1 I would like to thank the anonymous referees, Bjarke Viskum, Anne-Marie S. Christensen, Dennis M. 
Patterson and Sten Schaumburg-Müller for helpful critiques of this article. 
2 There are three main schools of interpretation of Wittgenstein: 1) ‘The standard reading’, attributing 
Wittgenstein with a theory of meaning: a realistic correspondence theory in the early period and an anti-
realistic use-theory in the later period. 2) ‘Therapeutic/Resolute readings’, claiming Wittgenstein makes 
no theory, that the aim of philosophy is therapeutic and that there are significant continuities between 
the early and the late Wittgenstein, and 3) ‘Elucidatory readings’, also claiming that Wittgenstein makes 
no theories, but that the aim of philosophy is also, for instance, to create conceptual overviews, rather 
than being purely therapeutic. For overviews of the discussions, see Crary (2000), Christensen (2003, 
2011), Pleasants (2008) and Bronzo (2012). 
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calls for not only problem solving and problem dissolving, but also something 
we might call reconciliation.3  
 
Cynicism: Might is Right 
In The Republic, Plato wants to prove that it is better to be just than unjust, and 
he investigates the idea of justice in order to understand the nature of a just 
republic (Plato 1987: 61-114). He does so in a playwright dialogue-style. The 
scene is Ancient Athens and the main character and protagonist is the philoso-
pher Socrates, who discusses justice with the various people he meets. One of 
them is the sarcastic sophist Thrasymachus, who brings forth the line of think-
ing that: “justice or right is simply what is in the interest of the stronger party.” 
(Plato 1987: 77). Today this line of thinking is called cynicism and is often re-
ferred to with the phrase ‘Might is right’.4 Cynicism often entails the claim that 
neither law nor morality have any genuine claim to legitimacy, and that ques-
tions of law or morality can be reduced without remainder to questions of what 
is in the interest of those in power. Also, cynicism often contains a view of 
humans as only being motivated by drives such as greed, ambition and gratifi-
cation. ‘Noble motives’ are only a clever disguise of the true selfish motivation 
(Barney 2017). Holiday describes a modern-day cynic in the following way:  
He is in a special sense, worldly wise; he is master of a set of manipulative techniques, 
made possible by advances in the study of politics, psychology and the social sciences, 
and has a grasp of the theories which underpin his technology. He is, in the true mean-
ing of the word, a professional, at home in the managerial world, in the intelligence 
 
3 In this article, the words ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are used interchangeably. 
4 The words ’cynicism’ and ’cynics’ has several – to some extent opposed – meanings. They also refer to 
the Ancient Greek and later Roman thinkers ’the cynics’ (’disciples of the dog’). The ancient cynics saw 
the road to a good life as entailing a rejection of all possessions and human desires for power, wealth, 
and fame (very unlike modern day cynics). They also, like the modern cynics, had a deep disrespect for 
the law and conventional morality. The ancient cynics tried to live as they preached – the most famous 
among them Diogenes, living in a tub ”to flaunt his disregard for the ways of men” (Copleston 1993: 
118-121, 438-445). The question of how exactly to spell out ’modern day cynicism’ and how modern-
day cynicism relates to forms of ’moral error theory’, ’moral scepticism’, ’moral egoism’ and ’moral emo-
tivism’ is debated. Neither will be clarified in this article. Holiday sees ’moral scepticism’ as a ’gentler and 
more detached cousin’ to cynicism, but both positions according to him share moral ’non-cognitivism 




gathering ‘community’, in journalism and, above all, in politics, because his true calling 
is the attainment and exercise of power. (Holiday 1989: xi)  
The former Italian prime minister and media mogul Silvio Berlusconi seems, in 
other words, to be a perfect incarnation of Holiday’s modern cynic with his 
strong blend of politics and media control. History has witnessed plenty of pol-
iticians, kings and dictators, whose life and actions display this kind of cynicism. 
They have often undermined the rule of law when they – sometimes using the 
law – place themselves outside the law. For instance, in 2012 Ilham Aliyjev, 
president of Azerbaijan, forced the parliament to pass a bill that gave him and 
his wife immunity against prosecution of any crimes that they made during his 
time as president. Other presidents, as Francois Duvalier from Haiti, have 
placed themselves outside both criminal and moral law by declaring themselves 
Gods (Hem 2013). ‘Cynicism’ can thus refer to both a philosophical theory as 
well as ways of acting and living. 
Because the rule of law and moral values are considered by most people 
to be worth protecting as parts of flourishing human lives, several philosophers 
have followed the lead of Plato and attempted to disprove the theory of cyni-
cism as well as to convert real life cynics. In the next section we will look at one 
such attempt.  
 
Moral Powers: How to Disprove Cynicism and Convert Cynics 
In his book Moral Powers, Anthony Holiday wants to defend a version of moral 
realism (Holiday 1989: xiv). Moral realism comes in many forms (Joyce 2016), 
but is a theory which typically entails claims to the effect that morality is part of 
reality, that we can have knowledge about morality, and that some moral judge-
ments are objectively true or false (Shaffer-Landau and Cuneo 2007: 157). Hol-
iday expresses this as ethical life, and action is part of the realm of the rational 
(Holiday 1989: xiv). This article looks at the moral realist ‘impulse’, rather than 
a particular moral realist theory. That is, the impulse to prove that moral judge-
ments are objectively true or false, and to do so by putting forth arguments to 
support a philosophical theory. Holiday’s work is interesting, despite not having 
been influential in shaping the landscape of modern day moral realism, because 
it so clearly displays one form of motivation for creating a moral realist theory; 
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that is, it displays what could be seen as ‘one of the seeds of’ or ‘possible first 
steps into’ such theory-construction (Kuusela 2008; Conant 2011). Holiday’s 
motivation for, and aim with his book, is explicit and two-fold: He wants to 
disprove cynicism as a philosophical theory, but his main goal is, however, to 
subvert real life cynics and offer a picture of the world that is less likely to breed 
a cynic culture than “the empiricist picture of the world as morally dead” (Hol-
iday 1989: x-xi; 182). 
In order to accomplish his aims, Holiday, like Plato, places himself in the 
philosophical tradition of ‘the art of helping’ (hjælpekunst) (Kierkegaard 1994: 
96): the strategy of addressing the misled and confused from his or her point of 
view, and from that place leading them to a sounder understanding of things. 
Holiday does so by reasoning in the following way: A cynic only believes in, and 
craves, power. Therefore: 
the cynic will be responsive only to counter-arguments which incorporate a theory 
concerned with power, [and therefore] I propose to offer him a theory of moral powers 
– a theory which will show that moral powers are immensely potent sources of power. 
(Holiday 1989: xi)  
Holiday sets out to do this by tapping into another great tradition in philosophy 
– the tradition of transcendental argumentation made famous by Immanuel 
Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. This form of argument starts with an un-
contested fact or experience, and in Holiday’s case the starting point is the fact 
that we have a language and communicate successfully with it. The next step is 
to ask for the necessary conditions of this fact to be in place. Holiday argues 
that truthfulness, trust, fair-play, just-dealings and reverence are the necessary 
conditions for us having a language at all (Holiday 1989: 73-114). For instance, 
if we do not in general speak the truth or keep our promises, talking and prom-
ising would quickly cease to have any point at all. These conditions are accord-
ing to Holiday all inherently morally normative phenomena.  
If my attempt to resolve the enigmas connected with the notion of semantic necessity 
is rightly directed, then neither the sceptical nor the cynical positions can be sound 
ones. For the questions ‘is moral knowledge possible’ and ‘why should I behave mor-
ally’ are undeniably framed in the medium of language, and that medium has been 
shown to be unimaginable without, and to depend for its coherence upon, certain value 
laden practices and moral certitudes. The cynic’s questions, therefore, logically fail to 




Holiday concludes that the moral cynic cannot in any consistent way claim – 
thus using language – that morality is not part of reality. On the contrary, the    
cynic has to recognise that moral values and moral normativity form part of 
what exists, because otherwise he would not be able to speak – and thus for-
mulate this theory – at all. This refutes cynicism as a philosophical theory.5 Hol-
iday then turns to his project of converting real life cynics. 
Holiday goes on to show that language and thus moral values are among 
“the dynamic in society whereby social formations are created and decease” 
(Holiday 1989: 183). Moral values are thus sources of power. Without preserving 
the practices of truthfulness, trust, fair-play, just-dealings and reverence all 
power will eventually crumble, because the upholding of such moral values are 
necessities for any use of power. Anybody interested in attaining or holding on 
to power, like the real-life cynic, therefore ought to pay serious attention to and 
respect morality. Here, Holiday offers the cynic cynically-relevant reasons to 
stop acting cynically, which could motivate a morally better behaviour.   
This is the overall structure of Holiday’s argumentation. In the next sec-
tions I will mainly use the work of the later Wittgenstein to argue that Holiday’s 
strategy for disproving the theory of cynicism is meaningful, but his strategy for 
subverting real life cynics is unconvincing.6  
 
If Moral Cynicism is Empty, so is Moral Realism  
In the work Über Gewissheit Wittgenstein investigates the concept of knowledge 
as well as different philosophical attempts to either doubt or prove the existence 
of the outer world. If we transfer the issue in Über Gewissheit to moral philosophy 
we can say that doubting or denying the existence of the outer world can be 
seen in analogy to moral scepticism and cynicism, where the reality of morality 
 
5 The details of Holiday’s arguments will not be discussed here, because it is his overall strategy in how 
he seeks to deal with real life cynicism that is under investigation in this article. For the rest of the article, 
it will therefore be assumed that Holiday has successfully shown the philosophical theory of cynicism to 
be incoherent and shown moral normativity in the form of e.g. the practices of truthfulness, trust, fair-
play, just-dealings and reverence to be pre-conditions for us having a language. 
6 I also use ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ from 1929, which is not considered part of the later period. However, 
many scholars argue that Wittgenstein’s view on ethics was one of the constant traits in his thinking 
during the early, middle and late periods (Christensen 2003, 2011). 
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is doubted or denied. Attempts at proving the existence of the outer world and 
our ability to have knowledge about it can be seen in analogy to Holiday’s at-
tempt to defend a theory of moral realism: that morality forms part of reality, 
that it is possible to gain knowledge about moral questions and that some moral 
judgements can be either true or false.  
Wittgenstein is often interpreted as having shown that both the philosoph-
ical doubt about and denial of the existence of the outer world (scepticism), and 
the attempts to prove the existence of the outer world (realism), are equally 
meaningless, because both theories entail various misuses of the concepts of 
knowledge, proof and certainty (Wittgenstein 1997: § 37; Diamond 1999; 
Moyal-Sharrock 2004, 2009; Herman 2015). Whether Wittgenstein is successful 
in his endeavour is obviously contested. In this article, it will be assumed that 
he is. Given that Wittgenstein is right in this line of thinking, one could suspect 
something similar is the case in moral philosophy; that both the moral cynic 
theories as well as the moral realist theories are not wrong, but lack sense.  
Holiday’s work on disproving the cynical theory – by showing how it de-
pends on the moral normativity, the validity of which it denies – can be seen as 
fulfilling the one half of the task of using Wittgenstein’s insights from Über 
Gewissheit in moral philosophy: showing how moral cynicism as a theory is self-
refuting or empty.7 But Holiday’s moral realist theory seems to represent an 
example of the other half of the kind of problem, which Wittgenstein deals 
with: if it is indeed impossible in the sense of meaningless to argue for the cynic 
theory (given that moral values, behaviours and practices are a precondition for 
language) then proving the reality of morality is equally meaningless.  
One reason for this is that every proof Holiday makes also already presup-
poses moral values, behaviours and moral normativity, and his arguments are 
therefore viciously circular as he presupposes what he wants to prove and is 
thus not proving anything, i.e. he commits the fallacy petitio principia. Holiday 
can prove the cynical theory to be inconsistent and otherwise flawed (and it can 
be important that philosophers do so, as I will argue later), but he cannot prove 
 
7 Other thinkers using Über Gewissheit as inspiration for work in moral philosophy are, for instance, Pleas-




the reality of morality. Doing so amounts to ‘digging after the bedrock has been 
reached’:  
Das Schwere ist hier, nicht bis auf den Grund zu graben, sondern den Grund, der vor 
uns liegt, als Grund zu erkennen. Denn der Grund spiegelt uns immer wieder eine 
größere Tiefe vor, und wenn wir diese zu erreichen suchen, finden wir uns immer wie-
der auf dem alten Niveau. (Wittgenstein 1991: Teil vi, § 31) 
Another way at getting at this point is to say that the reality of morality is as 
certain as, or rather immensely more certain than, any “proof” we can offer for 
it. The reality of morality, for instance the obligation to care for people in need, 
is therefore not a possible subject for a theory, as was the existence of the Higg’s 
particle, for example. In the latter case it was possible (again in the meaning ‘it 
made sense’) to have a theory about its existence and possible to say in advance 
what could count as proof of its existence etc. The same is not the case with 
morality. Moral normativity is part of the bedrock and precondition of human 
language and life.  
We are therefore left with the following question: What can philosophers 
offer the real-life, full-blown cynic as reasons to respect the – according to the 
cynic – non-existent demands of morality?  
  
The Power of Rational Arguments 
As we could read above, Holiday wishes not only to subvert a philosophical 
theory. His main aim is to address and subvert real life cynics. His attempt at 
motivating the cynic to become ‘a better person’ was to show that morality and 
power are internally connected: that is, one cannot retain the latter for long 
without respecting and protecting the former.  
As far as I can see, this argumentative strategy gives Holiday a problem, 
namely it seems to be the case that a person cannot be considered morally good 
if she is doing good only in order to become, or stay, powerful. To be a morally 
good person involves, among other things, to some extent wanting to do good 
– not only as a means, but also as an end in itself. If the cynic respected some 
moral values merely to gain gratification, power or wealth, it would thus be 
questionable whether she had really become a better person. Holiday’s project 
of finding a way of turning the real-life cynic into a better person is therefore 
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unconvincing so far. But maybe Holiday relies on something else to transform 
the cynic, namely what we can call ‘the power of logical necessity’? 
In order for Holiday’s project to make sense, that is writing this kind of 
philosophical book in order to subvert real life cynics, Holiday seems to rely on 
the power of philosophical arguments to change people’s lives. He is not alone 
in doing so. The same hope permeates many rationalistically flavoured books 
on moral philosophy, including Plato’s The Republic: the hope that if only phi-
losophers can prove once and for all that we really ought to be good, that it is 
truly better to be just than unjust, then the cynics of this world will change their 
destructive ways and the world will become a better place.  
One possible Wittgensteinian interpretation of Holiday’s optimism is to 
see it as the result of an unconscious conflation of causal and logical necessity.8 
We meet this conflation in the following conversation in Bemerkungen über der 
Grundlagen der Mathematik, where I interpret the remarks in ‘…’ to be the re-
marks of a person whom Wittgenstein is trying to lead out of philosophical 
confusion: 
’Du gibst das zu – dann mußt du das zugeben.’ – Er muß es zugeben – und dabei ist es 
möglich, dass er es nicht zugibt! Du willst sagen: ‘wenn er denkt, muß er es zugeben.’ 
‘Ich werde dir zeigen, warum du es zugeben mußt.’ – Ich werde dir einen Fall vor 
Augen führen, welcher, wenn du ihn bedenkst, dich bestimmen wird, so zu urteilen. 
[…] ’Aber bin ich also in einer Schlußkette nicht gezwungen, zu gehen, wie ich gehe?’ 
– Gezwungen? Ich kann doch wohl gehen, wie ich will! – ‘Aber wenn du im Einklang 
mit den Regeln bleiben willst, mußt du so gehen.’ – Durchaus nicht. (Wittgenstein 1991: 
Teil 1, §§ 51, 113) 
Here, Wittgenstein is reminding thinkers – in the grip of being tempted to con-
flate causal and logical necessity – of the differences between the kind of force 
‘logical necessity’ has compared to ‘causal necessity’, namely that the former, 
unlike the latter, leaves our freedom intact. We are not forced by rules or argu-
ments to ‘go in a certain way’, like we are forced to the ground after jumping 
off a cliff. We can ‘go as we want’. Yet, when philosophizing we can be tempted 
to think that logical necessity does nevertheless force us in some sense to go in 
 
8 I call it ‘unconscious’ because presumably, or rather obviously, if asked Holiday would not claim they 
are the same kind of necessity. Yet, nonetheless, in order for his way of addressing cynics to make sense, 
it seems to presuppose something like this image or idea (i.e. his choice of writing style and argumentative 




a certain way if we encounter a valid argument or follow a certain rule (see also 
Wittgenstein 1995: §§ 138-242). 
Wittgenstein also offers an explanation as to why we can be tempted to 
conflate the two kinds of necessity during philosophising. What can happen is 
that we are led astray by a picture of logical necessity that comes natural to us, 
because it is part of our everyday language. It is evident in phrases such as 
“Based on the evidence I have to say, the butler killed him” or “2 plus 2 always 
equals 4”. It is the picture of ‘the hard, unyielding logical must’ (Wittgenstein 
1991: Teil 1, §§ 34, 51). This picture is doing fine work as part of many everyday 
practices, for instance when we teach people how to use the basic rules of math-
ematics or understand formal logic. But according to Wittgenstein it tends to 
lead us in wrong directions when we philosophise.  
It is perhaps a giving into this temptation of conflating logical with causal 
necessity, which is the source of the optimistic belief in the power of philo-
sophical proofs and rationality that lies implicit in the work of philosophers like 
Holiday and Plato, i.e., that good arguments can transform cynics into better 
persons. However, even though Holiday does offer the cynic reasons to stop 
acting cynically, it is hard to imagine that the cynic herself is not already aware 
that her doings are to some degree undermining society, and thus in principle ( 
but clearly not always in practice) her ability to sustain power (as Berlusconi 
seems to be doing just fine). It seems that what the full-blown cynic is lacking 
is not knowledge or understanding of this fact, but rather a virtuous character 
for which such reasons would count, as they do to most other people. But in the 
case of hard-core cynics it seems pima facie unlikely that a Thrasymachus or a 
Berlusconi would be moved to change by an argument. And, if that should be 
the case, Holiday’s strategy misfires again, if the aim is to subvert real life cynics. 
Wittgenstein offers his readers an alternative picture to the tempting pic-
ture of logical necessity, which he hopes is less misleading when we are philos-
ophising. In the alternative picture of logical necessity, it is we humans, not the 
argument, who decide what to do after reading it, and it is our practices, which 
determine the consequences of ignoring proof or having alternative ways of 
following rules. ‘The hardness of the logical must’ is consequently the hardness 
of our practices: how strict and rigid our practices are, how strongly we honour 
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the rules, criteria, principles, paradigms, laws and values in question. We never 
allow ‘2 + 2 = 5’, and we always regard arguments with the structure of the 
Modus Ponens as valid. This firmness characterises logic and our mathematical 
practices (see also Christensen 2011: 808-809). “Was feststeht, tut dies nicht, 
weil es an sich offenbar oder einleuchtend ist, sondern es wird von dem, was 
darum herumliegt, festgehalten” (Wittgenstein 1997: § 144).  
What surrounds unquestionable truths, unbreakable laws, rigid rules etc. 
is in Wittgenstein’s thinking called ‘a language-game’, ‘a practice’, and ultimately 
‘a form of life’. In order to elucidate the demands that ethics places on us – 
what the nature of ethical normativity and the ‘ethical must’ is – we can there-
fore look at our practices and how we use words, when we use them with a 
moral aim.  
 
The Hardness of the Ethical Must  
We use the word good in various contexts (Wittgenstein 1995: § 77). Wittgen-
stein points to one of the characteristics of moral uses in the following quote: 
Suppose that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said ‘Well, you 
play pretty badly’, and suppose I answered ‘I know, I’m playing badly, but I don’t want 
to play any better,‘ all the other man could say would be ‘Ah then that’s all right’. But 
suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said ‘You’re 
behaving like a beast’ and then I were to say ‘I know I behave badly, but then I don’t 
want to behave any better,‘ could he then say ‘Ah that’s all right’? Certainly not; he 
would say ‘Well, you ought to want to behave better.’ Here you have an absolute judg-
ment of value. (Wittgenstein 1993: 39)  
The above remarks can serve to remind us of one aspect of the use of the words 
‘morally good’. What they show is that the hardness of ‘the ethical must’ is every 
bit as hard as the logical must: We can say, we don’t care about being good at 
baking cakes or running marathons, but, without being blameworthy, we cannot 
not care about being ethically good persons. In one sense, the cynic is free to 
act exactly as she pleases, but when doing so, what consequences her actions 
may have, or how she will or ought to be categorised is not up to her; this is 
determined by our practices: “It is up to me what I do to another, but it is not 
up to me, whether what I cause in this person’s life, is good or bad. It is not up 




my translation). This statement can be understood as ‘a grammatical remark’ on 
the concepts of the morally good and bad, i.e. remarks elucidating the meaning 
of the phrases ‘morally good’ and ‘bad’.  
Furthermore, it characterizes human practice in ethical matters that we 
punish forms of serious moral wrongdoing. And we do so far more severely 
than when the rules of logic, tennis or good table manners are violated (Han-
fling 2003: 27). According to Wittgenstein, we – and thus also the cynic – en-
counter here yet another kind of necessity than the causal and the logical: 
Mann kann aber dennoch sagen, dass die Schlußgesetze uns zwingen; in dem Sinne 
nämlich, wie andere Gesetze in der menschlichen Gesellschaft. Der Kanzlist, der so 
schließt, wie in (17), muß es so tun; er wäre bestraft worden, wenn er anders schlösse. 
Wer anders schließt, kommt allerdings in Konflikt: z.B. mit der Gesellschaft; aber auch 
mit anderen praktischen Folgen. (Wittgenstein 1991: Teil 1, § 116)  
The full-blown real-life cynic clearly is a person ‘der anders schließt‘ than the 
majority of people generally do. She furthermore does so in a way that runs the 
risk of a conflict with society; the kind of conflict which can end with a prison 
sentence or death and violent upheaval in the case of tyrants.  
In this and in the above sections it was argued that Holiday’s strategy for 
transforming real life cynics into better persons was not convincing. We can 
therefore ask: How do we then solve the problems we face in our societies 
stemming from cynicism?  
The short answer to the above question is that nothing can silence the 
challenges to society raised by cynicism, if one is looking for ‘a final solution’, 
i.e. something that can rid us of cynicism once and for all. It will always be a 
possibility that when a law or moral value is authoritative in a society, then it 
can be challenged. This is so because there is an inherent openness to morality. 
The openness of morality makes room for moral change. If we couldn’t chal-
lenge an existing moral conception or ideal, neither could we change it for the 
better. If morality did not contain this openness, a call like Nietzsche’s to ‘move 
beyond good and evil’ could never make sense, and occasionally, such a call has 
made sense. This openness does not, however, entail that we never have moral 




Kann ich nun prophezeien, daß Menschen die heutigen Rechensätze nie umstürzen 
werden, nie sagen werden, jetzt wüßten sie erst, wie es sich verhalte? Aber würde das 
einen Zweifel unserseits rechtfertigen? […] Aber das sagt nicht, daß wir zweifeln, weil 
wir uns einen Zweifel denken können (Wittgenstein 1997: § 652; Wittgenstein 1995: § 
84). 
In these quotes Wittgenstein points out that: the fact that we cannot be given a 
guarantee that the current basic rules of calculation will not be changed in the 
future and considered ‘defect’, does not constitute a valid reason to doubt them 
now. Neither does the fact that some moral doubt is intellectually imaginable 
mean that we in fact are in doubt or that we have morally good reasons to doubt 
or challenge, for example, a moral ideal. The latter is what the powerful cynic, 
challenging the rule of law and disregarding moral values shows us. It can be 
said that the cynic has reasons for what she does, but they are not morally good 
or valid reasons for challenging the laws, values and norms of society.  
When we look at the world, stable societies governed by the rule of law, 
with a low degree of corruption, and with citizens who find their society good 
and just, do exist. Therefore, it is clearly possible in another sense – other than 
the ‘once and for all’ sense – to answer legitimacy questions and curb real life 
cynicism. Otherwise these societies would have been undermined and cor-
rupted. To adequately answer how these societies manage to minimize breeding 
grounds for tyrants and a cynic culture lies outside the scope of this article, and 
it calls for resources and knowledge from outside that of philosophy – from the 
traditions, research, and experiences in areas like law, anthropology, psychol-
ogy, history and social science. But can philosophy have any role at all in mini-
mizing the breeding ground for cynicism?  
I believe philosophy can have a role, and that part of what Holiday does 
in his book is one example of how to try to do so. As mentioned above, Holiday 
is reacting to what he sees as the harmful effects of a certain image of the world, 
which he deems influential in his culture, namely “the empiricist picture of the 
world as morally dead” (Holiday 1989: x-xi; 182). This image, Holiday argues, 
tends to breed a cynic culture. Among other things it breeds a conception of 
humans as essentially selfish beings, whose main goal in life is the attainment 
of power and wealth. If we believe that Murdoch is right in claiming humans 




and our institutions according to our conception of what it means to be human 
(Murdoch 1999), then it can be morally important that philosophers, along with 
artists, anthropologists and psychologists etc., point to the short comings of the 
cynic world view and offer alternatives in its place. In this way we can help 
ourselves and our politicians not to be ‘caught by a picture’ (Wittgenstein 1995: 
§ 115), which is harmful and from which we otherwise can have difficulty to 
escape when first our politicians and institutions repeats it to us inexorably. One 
way of doing so is by publicly speaking out against it, as Holiday does. And 
where it was prima facie unlikely that any full-blow cynics would listen to these 
arguments, it is on the other hand likely that people, who are not yet, will. 
 
Cavell’s Challenge: Reconciliation with Disappointment and Sorrow 
In conclusion, if cynicism is an unavoidable possibility for any human in any 
society, then we might want to reconsider our way of understanding cynicism. 
It might not only be something that calls for problem-solving and -dissolving, 
but also be something we in one sense need to reconcile ourselves with. An 
inspiration to this approach can be found in Cavell’s writing on scepticism: 
[…] the griefs to which language repeatedly comes […] should be seen as normal to it, 
as natural to human natural language as skepticism is. (Hume calls skepticism an incur-
able malady; but here we see the poorness of that figure. Skepticism, or rather the threat 
of it, is no more incurable than the capacities to think and to talk, though these capacities 
too, chronically, cause us sorrow.) The philosophical pertinent griefs to which language 
comes are not disorders, if that means they hinder its working; but are essential to what 
we know as the learning or sharing of language, to our attachment to our language; 
they are functions of its order. (Cavell 1989: 54)  
In this quote, Cavell displays an insight into a challenge, which life poses to us 
as philosophers and as humans: to accept certain problems – sufferings – as 
immanent to the human form of life. These are problems with our language 
and laws, with each other and with how to deal with failing criteria and values 
(Brock 2013). And the challenge is also to accept that in one sense it is not bad 
that we have these problems (even though in another sense it can be), because 
the alternative to these problems would be that we were creatures with no free-
dom, no ability to reflect and no ability to be creative. In the same way Cavell 
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understands scepticism as a function of the order of language, we might con-
sider seeing cynicism as a function of ‘the order of morality’ – a function of its 
inherent openness.  
Our challenge is how to deal with moral flaws, suffering and uncertainty 
and as part of that reconcile ourselves with the fact that it is difficult to accept 
flaws, suffering, and uncertainty: We cannot cure the world of the possibility of 
cynicism and we cannot not want to cure it. Our balancing act is between the 
temptations of giving up by giving in to despair or being blinded by the vain 
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